Master password
Known only to you. It is stored nowhere — not on the server, not on the device, not in the keychain. Nobody can reset it, and that is the point.
In development · macOS alpha
Nobody reads your vault. Not even us.
SilentKey is an end-to-end encrypted password manager for Mac, iPhone, Windows and Android. One core in Rust, native on every platform, and a server that only ever holds encrypted blobs.
The Mac app runs today. iPhone, Windows and Android are next. There is no account to create before you can start.
Unlocking
Two secrets, and neither one is enough
Both go into the key derivation together. Somebody who steals the whole server database has nothing to guess against, because half the input never left your device.
Secret key
128 random bits, made on your first device. It stays in that device's keychain and on a sheet of paper you print and keep somewhere else.
Unlock key
Argon2id chews on both for about a tenth of a second, using 64 MiB of memory. Out comes the key that opens the vault — and it is never written down.
What the server sees
A stolen database is a pile of noise
Item names, web addresses, folders, attachment file names — all of it is encrypted on the device before anything is sent. Syncing is a stream of sealed boxes with a number on each.
What it can tell
- how many items you have, roughly
- when something last changed
- how big an attachment is, rounded
- which devices talk to it
What it cannot
- a single password, ever
- the name of one item or one folder
- which websites you have accounts on
- your master password — it is not there to steal
Signing in uses a signature, not a password. The server has no password of yours to lose.
Features
Everything a password manager owes you
And the parts that usually cost extra: one-time codes, attachments, import from wherever you are now, and an export that holds nothing back.
Logins, cards, notes, documents
Custom fields, password history, folders, tags, favourites and a trash that waits thirty days before it forgets.
One-time codes built in
TOTP and HOTP, imported from an otpauth:// link or a QR code, filled in right after the password.
Attachments up to 100 MB
Encrypted in chunks like everything else. A scan of your passport belongs with the passport, not in a folder called Documents.
Generator that makes sense
Passwords by length and character set, or a passphrase from a wordlist you can actually retype — in English or in Czech.
Quick access on ⌥Space
Type, press Return, the window is gone and the password is in the clipboard — which clears itself half a minute later.
Import from where you are now
1Password, KeePass, Bitwarden, LastPass and plain CSV. Nothing is dropped in silence; whatever cannot be mapped is reported by name.
Export that holds nothing back
Every item, every attachment, every one-time-code secret, any time, in a documented format. Leaving has to be easy or the promise is empty.
Sync you host yourself — or not at all
The vault lives on your device. The server is optional, runs from one Docker image, and still cannot read a thing.
Platforms
One core, native everywhere
The cryptography, the file format and the sync protocol are written once, in Rust, and called from every interface. Not five independent rewrites of AES — one surface small enough to audit in a single sitting.
| Platform | Interface | Status |
|---|---|---|
| macOS | SwiftUI | now Alpha — vault, sync, quick access |
| iOS · iPadOS | SwiftUI | next Shares the Mac code |
| Windows | WinUI 3 | planned |
| Android | Jetpack Compose | planned |
| Linux | GTK or Tauri | planned |
| Browsers | Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge | planned Filling in is the part that decides whether people keep it |
Where it stands
Honest about what is done
SilentKey is not on any store yet and has not been audited by anyone outside the project. That audit is planned before 1.0, not after it.
Working today
- Core in Rust: key derivation, vault format, storage, attachments, generator, one-time codes, import, export
- Mac app in English and Czech, with its own icon
- Sync server with per-item conflict resolution and attachment transfer
- Preflight with two scenario probes against real files, a real keychain and a real server
Not there yet
- Unlocking by fingerprint needs a provisioning profile the project does not have yet
- Browser extensions, iOS, Windows and Android
- Vault watch: leaked, weak and reused passwords
- Shared vaults, passkeys, and an audit by somebody else
Get in touch
Questions are welcome
Especially the awkward ones about the cryptography. A password manager that cannot answer them does not deserve your passwords.